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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SHARON KNIGHT, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
Case No. ~ ( [(J8{r; ·7 
vs. 
DANIEL R. LEIGH, 
Defendant/Respondent.: 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a personal injury action based upon the concept 
of negligence in that the plaintiff/appellant, while negligently 
operating her automobile in driving through an intersection in 
Ogden, Utah, on October 28, 1977, caused both property damage 
and personal injury to the defendant/respondent. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried in the District Court of Weber 
County, the Honorable Calvin Gould presiding, sitting without 
a jury, on the 4th day of December, 1979. The court found 
the appellant 100% negligent and the proximate cause of the 
accident giving rise to this suit~ denying het recovery 
against the respondent and granting judgment against the 
appellant and in favor of the respondent in the sum of 
$7,048.55. Said judgment included property damage and special 
and general damages for personal injury. 
RELIEf SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks a dismissal of appell~nt's appeal 
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and ari~affirmation of the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In the early evening of October 28, 1977, appellant 
was traveling south on Washington Boulevard in Ogden, Weber 
County, Utah, in a 1965 Chevrolet. She approached the 
intersection of Washington Boulevard, 2nd Street and Harrisville 
Road, commonly known as 5-Points. It was appellant's intention 
to execute a left hand turn from Washington Boulevard and then 
travel east-bound on 2nd Street. At approximately the same 
time, respondent's vehicle was traveling north-bound on 
Washington Boulevard intending to proceed through the inter-
section and continue north on Washington Boulevard. As the 
respondent proceeded through the intersection heading north, 
appellant executed a left hand turn to go east and the vehicles 
collided causing damage to both vehicles and injury to each 
party. At the trial on December 4, 1979, the appellant 
testified that she was in the left turn lane behind one 
other vehicle preparing to execute a left turn when the light 
at the intersection>was green. She did not see the light 
turn to amber or red, but apparently, at some point, after 
she observed the light was green, she began to execute her 
t At the time she executed her turn, she collided with urn. 
respondent's vehicle. She further testified that she did not 
see the respondent's vehicle until it was in the intersection, 
claiming, that apparently, there was heavy traffic north-bound 
on Washington Boulevard, and that he had been traveling behind 
another vehicle some distance from the intersection and had 
-2-
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come out from behind that vehicle and, therefore, she did 
not see him. The respondent testified along with his 
passenger, Rick Bushman, that they were traveling in the 
insi4e lane of traffic going north (Washington Boulevard, 
in t~is area, has two lanes of traffic going north and south 
on each side of a divider), and that as he approached the 
intersection the light was green; that as he entered the 
intersection, the light turned yellow; that he did not speed 
up, and that as he continued on through the intersection, he 
was struck by appellant's vehicle. The appellant called other 
witnesses, Doreen Halacy and James Barnes, who were at various 
places near the intersection at the time the accident occurred, 
to testify about the status of the semaphore light. Both 
witnesses were confused about the sequence of the lights and, 
in fact, each gave testimony ~hat was different from the 
others and not accurate. Hal?CY testified that the light was 
red for the respondent's vehicle when h~ entered the inter-
section, but g+een for the appellant's vehicle because she 
was coming from Harrisville Road and the light was green for 
Harrisville Road. This was not the case. Witness Barnes 
testified that the light was green for the south-bound 
vehicles on Washington, (but red for north-bound at the same 
tirne. This was also no'J: the case. The respondent called 
Hal:-ry Moore from the State of Utah Traffic Engineer's office 
wh<) testified as to the sequence of the lights at 5-Points. 
The critical part of his testimon~ was that the light was the 
same for north and south-bound traffic on Washington Boulevard 
-3-
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Ther~fore, if the light was green for the appellant, it was 
green for the respondent. If the light was yellow for the 
appellant, it was yellow for the respondent, and red and 
red, and so forth for the appellant. The court held that the 
respondent entered the intersection traveling in the through 
lane of traffic nearest the center of the roadway, and that 
he entered the intersection in a lawful and prudent manner 
intending to proceed through the intersection traveling north-
bound. That the appellant attempted a left turn at the time 
that respondent's automobile was so close to the intersection, 
that the automobile constituted an innnediate hazard to the 
intersection. Thata resulting collision proximately caused 
injuries and damages to the respondent to the extent of $7,048.55 
and that the appellant was 100% negligent. The court found that 
the testimony of Halacy and Barnes was not reliable because of 
their confusion as to the sequence of the lights. The court 
entered judgment accordingly, and from that judgment, appellant 
appealed and defendant/respondent now requests that the appeal 
be dismissed. 
ARGUMENT 
DECISIONS OF THE TRIAL COURT WILL NOT BE 
OVERTURNED ON APPEAL UNLESS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS 
AND MUST BE AFFIRMED IF SUPPORTED BY ANY 
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
This court has consistently enunciated its doctrine 
t~ 
for review of trial court decisions in numerous cases. In 
Utah, the findings of the trier of fact will not be disturbed 
n 
on appeal unless clearly erroneous or arbitrary and capricious. 
-4-
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Where no error of law is asserted, but only a different 
view of the facts, the facts will be reviewed on appeal 
in the light most favorable to susfaining the decision of 
the trial court, and if there exists any substantial evidence 
and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom to support the 
trial court's conclusions, then the decision will not be 
disturbed on appeal. See Jensen v~ Eddy, 30 Utah 2d 154, 
514 P.2d 1142 (1953), reaffirmed in Town & Country Inn v. 
M~rtin, 563 P.2d 195 (1977), and ~ore recently Osuala v. 
Olsen, case no. 16492, filed March~24, 1980. It is abundently 
clear in this case that appellant is concerned, not with any 
errors of law or procedure, but has a difference of opinion 
as to the trial court's factual conclusions covering res-
ponsibility for the accident. The court should specifically 
take note of the fact that the appellant·does not argue with 
the judge's application of the rule that~if the~appellant 
attempted a left turn at a time when respondent's automobile 
was so close to the intersection, 'that respondent's auto-
mobile constituted an innnediate hazard to the intersection, 
then appellant would be the negligent party. There was also 
no disagreement by appellant that the trier of fact has 
great discretion pursuant to Utah's comparative.negligence 
doctrine in assessing responsibility for an acc~dent between 
parties. Appellant does nqt ~isagree that in Utah in an 
intersection situation, a vehicle passing through the 
intersection would have the right-of-way over a vehicle 
executing a turn in the intersection. The driver going 
-5-
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·'hi 
through the intersection has the right to do so wil:hout 
interference from a:turning vehicle, and that vehicle is 
not. allowed to proce,ed with a turn if the vehicle with 
the right-of-way constitutes an immediate hazard to the 
intersection. In e~sence, appellant does not find fault 
with the judge's application of the law to this particular 
kind of accident. What appellant seems to be saying is 
that the judge should not have discounted the testimony 
of the witnesses Halacy and Barnes because of certain 
errors they made in the sequence.of the lights, and had he 
not discounted the testimony, he could have found that the 
respondent entered the intersection on a yellow or red 
light and, that, therefore, the negligence of the respondent 
was either equal to· or greater than that of the appellant. 
It is critical to note that the appellant never argued at 
any tim~ in her brief, that the court could not have found 
th•e facts as it did from the testimony adduced but, that 
considering appellant's view of the testimony of Halacy, 
Ba~nes and the respondent, that the court could also find 
that their testimony was reliable and that the facts indicated 
th~t the respondent's negligence was greater than appellant's. 
This admission in the brief that the court could have found 
for either position from the facts, in effect, renders the 
appellant's position on appeal without merit. 
The trial co~rt is the sole judge of the credibility 
of the witnesses. Both Halacy and Barnes made critical 
errors in their testimony which affected their credibility. 
_/:.._ 
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While both maintained that the respondent had entered the 
intersection on a red light, they each indicated that the 
appellant had made her turn on a green light; according 
to Halacy, from Harrisville Road; according to Barnes, 
from Washington Boulevard. Appellant admits that these 
statements were erroneous, but discounts their impact in 
the trial. The point is, that whether or not these particular 
statements were, in and of themselves conclusive as to what 
happened at that intersection, they cast ~oubt as to the 
credibility of the witnesses' statements or other observations 
that they made. While it is true that they we+~ both indepen-
-" 
dent witnesses and unknown,to each'party, they' also, as many 
;:;•,I :, l 
individuals do, came upon a situat!on apd observed it differently. 
It is because of these kinds of problems that a trier of fact 
must sit as an independent judge weighing all of the testimony 
and make his independent evaluation. Judge Gould, in this 
case, evaluated the credibility of the witnesses and made 
his decision that their statements. were not reliable, 
particularly, when viewed in the l~ght of HafrY Moore's 
(State Traffic Engineer) testimony. The interesting thing 
about this case is that Moore's testimony supported that of 
both appellant and respondent. That is, that the light would 
be the same color for both of the parties. If the light was 
red for the appellant, it would have been red. for the respondent. 
< ~. I ' 
Yellow for the appellant, yellow for the respondent, green 
and green. That it would not have been different for one 
or the other. Based upon this testimony, the impact of the 
-7-
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*~iii 
Halacy-and Barnes statements, is even less significant. 
What is apparent is:a situation where two individuals are 
entering an interse6tion where the -ligh.t is changing in the 
same manner for both. One is making a turn and the other 
is going straight. It is clear that the car that is going 
straight has the right-of-way under any circumstances. It 
is further clear that the person executing the turn must 
not execute the turn if the automobile with the right-of-way 
is so close to the intersection as·to constitute an immediate 
hazard. There is also no question from the testimony of the 
appellant and respondent, that respondent's vehicle was close 
enough to the intersection to constitute a hazard, regardless 
of the dispute as to what color the light was. The evidence 
is in dispute concerning what the condition of the light 
was when the respondent actually entered the intersection. 
Discounting the Halacy and Barnes testimony, the only other 
testimony bearing o~ that issue comes from the appellant 
and the respondent.r The appellant states that she was in 
the intersection on"a green light and turned before the 
light was red. She :;was under the semaphore light, however, 
and did not see how it changed. The respondent testified 
that upon approaching the intersection, when he looked the 
light was green, but that he believed it changed to yellow 
as he entered the intersection. In any event, the evidence 
strongly suggests that both parties were in the intersection 
on a yellow light. At least the court could find that to be 
the fact from the evidence adduced. Even if they were both 
-8-
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there on a red light, if the respondent's vehicle was close 
enough to the intersection to constitute an innnediate 
hazard, he still has t~~ right-of-way and the other car 
must yield. There is abso+µtely no showing from any of 
. . ' . 
the evidence that the light changed.red befo~e the respondent 
entered the intersection. Had this happened, the appellant 
would qave been through her turn and the accident would 
never have taken,place. What is apparent from the overall 
testimony, is that an intersection accident took place with 
one vehicle having the right-of-way to go straight ahead, 
and another attempting to make a left turn to go through 
that right-of-way path. The court, having the ultimate 
responsibility to judge the credibility of the witnesses, 
what facts to accept and not accept, to make decisions as 
to what to bel~eve, believed that the respondent ent~red 
the intersection appropriately and that he'was close enough 
; . 
to constitute a hazard so that the appellant should have 
yielded. Because of that finding, he prpperly assessed 
100% of the negligence on the part of the appellant. 
Interestingly enough, many of the ~~guments raised by the 
appellant in her brief were ~ot raised at the trial court . 
. . 
•' 
Asstnning that the court tool< all of the :.~acts into consideration 
and giving the court's findings the prestµnptionJ'.:o whi~h they 
are entitled in viewing the: facts, there i~ no question that 
the court could have found as it did bas~d on substantial 
evidence. The respondent· is not ~equired to prove that the 
court must have found as it did, excluding··-any other! possible 
-9-
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·'0.;~. ~ ~' 
findings, in order to sustain the verdict. The appellant, 
on the other hand, must demonstrate that there was no 
rational basis for the court's decision, no substantial 
facts upon which the decision can be sustained, or that 
the court acted arbitrarily and capriciously and clearly 
erroneously. The appellant has failed to demonstrate any 
of these requisites. The appellant's own brief admits that 
the court could have found as it did, but also could have 
found that the appellant's view of the facts was the accurate 
view. She takes great issue with the fact that the court 
found two witnesses unreliable, but this is the court's 
prerogative and any finder of fact's prerogative, and 
cannot be overturned unless clearly erroneous. The appellant 
has failed to meet the burden required by this court to 
reverse a trial court's findings and, as such, the appeal 
should be dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
Judgments of the trial court will not be disturbed 
unless clearly erroneous. The trial court's findings must 
be sustained if there is any rational basis for such findings 
supported by substantial evidence. In this case, the trial 
court had a rational basis for its findings, which are 
supported by substantial evidence and, therefore, its judgment 
should be affirmed. · 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 
Respondent 
-
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Mailed a true and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing Brief of Respondent to attorney for appellant, 
Timothy W. Blackburn, Bank of Utah, Suite 320, 2605 Washington 
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day of May, 1980. 
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